






CENTRE FOR FINANCE 
AND CREDIT MARKETS 
Working Paper 11/10 
Debt and Depression: Evidence 





Centre for Finance and Credit Markets 
School of Economics 





Tel: +44(0) 115 951 5619 
Fax: +44(0) 115 951 4159 
enquiries@cfcm.org.uk June 2011 
 
 
DEBT AND DEPRESSION: EVIDENCE ON CAUSAL LINKS AND 







Using individual-level panel data, this paper examines the relationship between 
problem debt and psychological health. Individuals exhibiting problem debt, by 
either subjective or objective measures, also exhibit much worse psychological 
health, by either subjective or objective measures. However, selection into problem 
debt on the basis of poor psychological health accounts for much of this difference. 
The causality between problem debt and psychological health may be two-way. 
Local house price movements exogenous to individual households are used to 
establish the causality from problem mortgage debt to psychological health. In 
addition, the social stigmas effects of problem debt are investigated using local 
bankruptcy and repossession rates as indicators of the local prevalence of problem 
debt in a reference group population. Results indicate there is a sizeable causal link 
between problem debt and psychological health and that reference group effects are 
also significant in magnitude.  
 
Key words:      debt, over-indebtedness, depression, reference group effects 
JEL classification:     I10, D14 
 
* School of Economics, University of Nottingham. 
Contact Details: School of Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University of 
Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD  Tel: (44) 1158 466447 Fax: (44) 1159 514159   email: 
john.gathergood@nottingham.ac.uk 
I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for providing funding for 
my post-doctoral research fellowship. 
 
 DEBT AND DEPRESSION: EVIDENCE ON CAUSAL LINKS AND 
SOCIAL STIGMA EFFECTS 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between household problem debt, otherwise 
known as over-indebtedness, and psychological health using the U.K.’s household panel 
survey. Access credit improves individuals’ welfare by facilitating consumption smoothing. 
However, inability to repay debts can result in drastic welfare losses arising from bankruptcy 
or the seizure of collateral such as housing. Psychiatrists commonly report problem debt as a 
source of severe anxiety and psychological distress (Fitch, 2007).  In the medical literature 
small-scale studies based on individuals exhibiting poor mental health find problem debts to 
be a common correlate with depression, anxiety and even self-harm (Hatcher, 1994; Reading 
and Reynolds, 2001; Maciejewski et al., 2000). The economics and health literatures 
document a strong statistical association between problem debt and poor psychological health. 
Studies based on larger sample of cross-sectional survey data using self-reported health data 
show the positive association between high levels of debt or usage of high-cost credit and 
poor psychological health is not readily explained by covariates such as demographic and 
related characteristics or other existing health conditions (Bartel and Taubman, 1986; Lea et 
al., 1995; Drentea, 2000; Brown et al., 2005; Hamilton et al., 1997; Lenton and Mosley, 
2008).   
What is more difficult to establish is causality between problem debt and 
psychological stress. The positive relationship between the two might be explained by 
unobserved factors not captured in cross-section analysis. Also, there is the possibility of a 
two-way causality between debt and depression: the anxiety and worry caused by the onset of 
problem debt might lead to an individual’s psychological health, or alternately an individual’s psychological health might lead them to incur problem debts. Understanding the relationship 
from self-reported debt to self-reported depression is made more difficult by the possibility 
that an individual’s perception of the severity of their debt problems may be affected by their 
psychological health state. An individual with poor psychological health might be more, or 
less, inclined to subjectively report they are struggling with debts compared to an individual 
with good psychological health in the same financial situation. Establishing the causality 
between problem debt and depression is further made difficult by the challenge of finding 
suitable instruments which provide exogenous variation in problem debts which are plausibly 
unrelated to an individual’s psychological health. 
A recent study by Bridges and Disney (2010) uses a short-panel of U.K. household 
survey data (The Family and Children Survey) to model the relationship between debt and 
psychological health. They find that objective measures of debt problems (such as self-
reported values for arrears or late payment on credit) correlate more weakly with subjective 
evaluations of poor health than subjective measures of debt problems (such as questions 
which ask individuals about their ability to cope with their financial burdens). Furthermore, 
they model the simultaneous relationship between debt and psychological health in a 
bivariate probit model and find the relationship between both objective and subjective 
measures of problem debt and psychological health weakens further. They conclude that poor 
psychological health affects an individual’s perception of their financial situation and that 
unobserved heterogeneity in the tendency of individuals to report problems with both their 
health and their finances explains most of the observed correlation between measures of 
problem debt and measures of psychological health.  
This study investigates the relationship between problem debt and psychological 
health for the U.K. It uses data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) previously 
used by Wildman (2002) and Brown et al. (2005) related studies. Although the financial data contained in the BHPS is inferior to that found in FACS, the key advantage of using the 
BHPS in this study is that it includes data on the geographical location of the household, not 
available in FACS. This data is crucial for the instrumental variable strategy used to identify 
the causal impact of problem debt (which uses local level house price movements), and to 
establish reference group effects (which are defined at the local level) later in the paper. The 
BHPS also has the advantage of including the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) as an 
alternative to self-reported data on anxiety-related medical conditions, allowing a comparison 
between subjective and objective measures of poor psychological health. Also, the BHPS has 
the advantage of being more representative of the population as a whole. Whereas FACS 
surveys only family units with children and in the vast majority of cases interviews the 
mother (with women twice as likely to report depression compared with men in the U.K.), the 
BHPS is a representative sample of all U.K. households and adopts the typical convention of 
allowing the household to self-assign the household head and interviews all members of the 
household. Finally, the BHPS is a long-running household panel and so provides a usable 
number of observations of individuals with very severe debt problems. 
This study makes the following contributions. Firstly, it documents the large cross-
sectional inequality in psychological health arising from problem debts. This is established 
for both a subjective health measure (the General Health Questionnaire) and an objective 
measure (anxiety or depression reported by individuals as a medical condition) together with 
a subjective problem debt measure (the self-reported burden of debt) and objective problem 
debt measure (arrears on debt) for mortgage and non-mortgage debts. In a multivariate model 
estimated on cross-section data with a range of demographic and socio-economic controls 
individuals who report they face ‘difficulty’ meeting their housing payments (mortgage or 
rent) are at least two months late on their housing payments, or who report that meeting their consumer credit repayments presents a ‘heavy burden’ to their household, exhibit worse 
GHQ scores and greater propensity to suffer from depression.  
  Secondly, it shows that selection into problem debt on the basis of poor 
psychological health accounts for much of the observed cross-sectional variation in 
psychological health between those with and without problem debts. One limitation of those 
studies based which find an association between problem debt and psychological distress in 
cross-sections of individuals is that the cross-sectional correlation might to some degree arise 
from selection. This is found to be the case: individuals who are observed to move into 
arrears on their housing payments or into reporting a heavy burden of debts between two 
waves of data exhibited, on average, worse psychological health than those not moving into 
debt problems in the first wave of data. This positive selection into problem debt on the basis 
of poor psychological health accounts for approximately half of the observed difference in 
health in the cross-section comparison between the two groups.  
Thirdly, the study attempts an instrumental variables strategy towards understanding 
the causal impact of problem debt on psychological health by using variation in local level 
house prices as exogenous variation in the severity of the consequences of inability to meet 
mortgage debt commitments. It does so in the following manner: it is shown that mortgage 
holders who enter into arrears on their mortgage debts in localities where house prices are 
growing (and so their home equity ‘buffer’ is increasing) suffer less deterioration in 
psychological health compared to individuals who enter into arrears in localities where house 
prices are falling (and so their home equity ‘buffer’ is decreasing). Home equity buffers have 
been shown to be important forms of consumption insurance for households facing adverse 
income shocks (Hurst et al. 2005; Benito, 2009). This instrumental variable strategy allows a 
natural comparison group – renting households – for whom the impact of rent arrears on 
psychological health is shown to be unaffected by local house price movements, hence allowing us to rule out the possibility that local house price movements simply proxy for 
local economic conditions in these regressions. 
  Fourthly, the impact of the onset of problem debt on psychological health is shown to 
demonstrate a ‘reference group’ effect. To this author’s knowledge no study in the literature 
to date has considered the role for reference group effects in the relationship between 
problem debt and psychological health; though such effects have been widely studied in the 
labour supply and consumption literatures (see Lindbeck et. al., 1999; Binder and Pesaran, 
1998). Individuals who exhibit the onset of problems repaying their unsecured debts in 
localities with a higher bankruptcy rate are shown to experience less deterioration in 
psychological health compared to individuals exhibiting the onset of problem repaying their 
unsecured debts in localities with lower bankruptcy rates. In the context of a uniform 
bankruptcy law across localities (and so little reason to believe that non-payment on 
unsecured debts is more likely to result in a bankruptcy filing in one region compared with 
another) this result is interpreted as evidence of a reduced stigma associated with problem 
debt in areas in which problem debt is more prevalent. By contrast, individuals who exhibit 
the onset of problems repaying their secured debts in localities with higher mortgage 
repossession rates are shown to experience more deterioration in psychological health 
compared to individuals exhibiting the onset of problems repaying their secured debts in 
localities with lower mortgage repossession rates. One interpretation of this result is that 
variation in repossession rates across localities reflects in part variation in the aggressiveness 
with which mortgage lenders seek repossession orders in different localities. 
2.  Data 
2.1 The BHPS This section describes the BHPS data. The BHPS is a long-running household panel 
survey for the U.K. which started in 1991 and has been conducted annually; the most recent 
available data is for the year 2008. All 18 available waves of data are used for this study. The 
BHPS is a general household survey which began with approximately 5,500 households with 
10,000 individuals from England and Wales in 1991, interviewing adults in the household on 
a range of socio-economic topics including their finances, labour market activity and health. 
The survey was subsequently expanded to include samples of households from Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Since the 1991 survey, annual follow-up surveys have tracked 
off-shoot households and households who leave the panel have been replaced. Wave 18 of 
the survey covers approximately 8,000 households and 26,000 individuals. 
The BHPS includes detailed information on demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics relevant for this study, such as respondent age, gender, marital status, number 
and age of child dependents, ethnic minority status, educational achievements and labour 
market status. These variables are important control variables for modelling the relationship 
between problem debt and psychological health in the econometric analysis which follows. 
Also, the key advantage of using the BHPS for this study is that it contains geographic 
identifiers (available down to the census statistical area level) not available in the FACS used 
by Bridges and Disney (2010). This data is crucial for the analysis as it allows the matching 
of local house price index data and local bankruptcy and repossession rate data also used in 
the econometric analysis which follows. As the health and debt data are central to this study, 
these are now considered in more detail. 
2.2 Psychological Health Data 
The health data contained in the BHPS takes the form of a variety of self-reported 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ health measures. ‘Objective’ in this contexts refers to survey questions in which individuals are asked to identify whether they have a particular health 
problem for which they are receiving treatment as opposed to ‘subjective’ questions which 
ask individuals to evaluate their own health state on a likert scale. To some extent all self-
reported data is subjective in the sense that individuals might choose to mis-report or conceal 
data even in scenarios in which objective questions (such as about having a particular health 
condition) are clear-cut.  
In the interviewer-lead health module of the survey all adult respondents in the household 
are first asked to identify themselves as disabled or not, and then asked a question about their 
general health status: ‘Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health has 
been. Compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the whole 
been ... Excellent , Good , Fair, Poor , or Very Poor?, Don't know’. Following this question 
respondents are then asked to identify the health problems or disabilities which they currently 
suffer from among those on a list, the most relevant of which for this analysis is ‘Anxiety, 
depression of bad nerves, psychiatric problems’. The details of the specific wording of the 
question and list of choices in full are given in Appendix 1 under Question 1. It is important 
to note that the interviewer conducting the survey asks respondents to ignore temporary 
conditions when responding to this question.  
Following on from this question, respondents are asked a series of questions on whether 
their health limits the types of activities and work they can undertake. Respondents aged over 
65 are asked a series of questions about whether they can undertake a range of specific daily 
tasks. All respondents are asked whether and how many times they visited their GP or 
hospital in the previous year, whether they experienced an accident which required 
hospitalisation in the previous year. Finally, a set of questions on use of NHS care private 
medical insurance bring the health module to a close. The BHPS also includes the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) in each wave. The 
GHQ is comprised of a series of 12 questions in which respondents are asked to identify how 
frequently they currently feel, relative to their normal state, depression, anxiety leading to 
insomnia, inability to cope and a number of related feelings (details of the particular 
questions asked are provided in Appendix 1). Respondents can choose from ‘not at all’, ‘no 
more than usual’, ‘rather more than usual’ and ‘much more than usual’. Responses to the 
GHQ forms the basis for the ‘GHQ Caseness Score’, also known as the ‘Caseness GHQ’, a 
well-known measure of psychological health used in the medical and psychological literature 
and increasingly in the economics literature as a measure of ‘mental’ or ‘psychological’ 
health or ‘wellbeing’ (such as Clark, 2003). The GHQ Caseness Score is calculated by 
counting the number of cases in which an individual reports ‘rather more than usual’ or 
‘much more than usual’. Hence a score of 12 indicates the individual reported they feel each 
of the 12 feelings at least ‘rather more than usual’ and a score of 0 indicates the individual 
feels each of the 12 feelings not more than ‘no more than usual’. On this basis, a score of 12 
represents the lowest level of psychological wellbeing (worst mental health) and a score of 0 
represents the highest level of psychological wellbeing (best mental health). Some studies 
invert this 12-point score, known as the ‘inverted GHQ’ such that a higher value represents a 
better level of psychological health.  
  From this health data we identify two measures of ‘psychological health’ which will 
be used as the dependent variable in the econometric analysis. We use answers to the 
question on specific health conditions which asks respondents to identify whether they suffer 
from ‘anxiety, depression or bad nerves, psychiatric problems’ as an objective measure of 
their psychological health which takes a dummy form with a value of 1 for yes and 0 for no.  
We take the GHQ Caseness Score as a subjective measure of psychological health (on the 
basis the question is intrinsically subjective by asking respondents to evaluate their current experience against their ‘usual’ state) which is ordered between 0 and 12, with 12 
representing the poorest state of mental health. We also have a subjective general health 
question (Question 1) available plus the objective data on other medical conditions from 
which the respondent is suffering. 
  
2.3 Data on Household Finances and Problem Debts 
  The BHPS asks respondents detailed question on their household finances only every 
five years (in waves 5, 10 and 15) so it is not possible to construct balance sheet information 
for each wave of the survey. However, in each wave respondents are asked some questions 
relating to their finances: detailed questions about their income, the amount they save from 
their current income, an estimate of the value of their home and any debts secured against it 
together with the type of mortgage they currently hold and the cost of their monthly housing 
payment (mortgage or rent). In addition, the head of household is asked in each wave the 
following questions about their household’s financial situation. 
  All respondents who either own a home via a mortgage or who rent a home are asked: 
“Many people these days are finding it difficult to keep up with their housing payment. In the 
last twelve months would you say you have had any difficulties paying for your 
accommodation?(Yes / No) followed by the question “In the last twelve months have you ever 
found yourself more than two months behind with your rent / mortgage”? (Yes / No). In 
addition to these questions asked in all waves beginning 1991, since 1995 all respondents 
who have outstanding unsecured credit on which they are making repayments are asked: “To 
what extent is the repayment of such debts and the interest a financial burden on your 
household? Would you say it is.... A heavy burden, Somewhat of a burden, Not a problem.” 
  From answers to the first question we construct a (1/0) dummy variable for the 
respondent’s subjective evaluation of their difficulty paying for their housing based on the yes/no answers. We designate this variable to be a subjective response as the interpretation of 
the term ‘difficult’ might vary between households From the second question we similarly 
construct a (1/0) dummy variable for the respondent’s objective housing arrears position 
based on their yes/no answer. As with the health question responses, the designation of this 
variable as an objective measure of problem debt is dependent upon individuals being willing 
to truthfully answer the question. From the third question we construct a (1/0) dummy 
variable for the respondent’s subjective evaluation of their difficulty meeting their unsecured 
debt payments which takes a value of 1 is the respondent reports ‘A heavy burden’ or 
‘somewhat of a burden’ and a value of 0 if they report ‘not a problem’ 
 
2.4 C h and Problem Debt   
From the responses to health-related ques
ombining Subjective Data on Healt
tions and problem debt questions in the 
BHPS we are therefore able to construct one objective measure of poor psychological health 
(anxiety as a medical condition), one subjective measure of poor psychological health (the 
GHQ Caseness Index Score), one objective measure of problem debt (2+ months late on 
housing payment) and two subjective measures of problem debts (whether meeting housing 
payments presents difficulty to the household, whether consumer credit payments are 
somewhat of a burden or a heavy burden).  
As discussed in the introduction, establishing the direction of causality between 
households suffering poor mental health and problem debt raises the problem of excluding 
the reverse causality. A further, and potentially more severe, difficulty in examining the 
relationship between debt and mental health is the possibility that self-reported measures of 
problem debt or arrears might themselves be biased by an individual’s mental health state. If 
a respondent’s mental health state impacts upon their perception of their financial state, 
financial data reported by respondents with poor mental health could be unreliable. This is potentially a severe problem to the researcher seeking to understand the relationship between 
debt and mental health. By way of illustration of this problem, consider the counter-example 
of the relationship between unemployment and health. As with the case of debt and health, 
causality may run in either direction: the depressive effects of unemployment may lead to 
deterioration in an individual’s psychological health or, conversely, deteriorating 
psychological health might compromise an individual’s capacity to work and ultimately lead 
to redundancy. But it is very unlikely that an individual’s psychological health would affect 
their perception of their labour market state (though it may affect their willingness to report 
their true labour market state).  
However, in the debt-health relationship, an individual’s psychological health may 
affect their perception of the severity of their debt problems or size of their debt ‘burden’. It 
may be the case that individuals with poor psychological health are more likely to perceive a 
given situation as being problematic compared to individuals with good psychological health, 
such that the debt-health relationship is purely driven by perception. This might be 
particularly applicable to subjective measures of problem debt (questions which ask 
individuals to self-assess how much of a burden they consider their debts to be), answers to 
which may be biased by the respondent’s mental health state. It is also possible that objective 
measures of problem debt (such as asking individuals to estimate the value of their homes) 
are biased by an individual’s mental health state. If that is the case – and we can trust neither 
subjective nor so-called objective measures of problem debt - then it will not be possible to 
make any reliable inferences about the relationship between debt and mental health from self-
reported data. Nevertheless, with this caveat, we proceed with an analysis of the relationship 
between these subjective and objective measures of problem debt and psychological stress. 
3. Results 3.1 Cross-Section and Panel Evidence on Problem Debt and Psychological Health 
  The inequality in psychological health between respondents by their problem debt 
status is illustrated in Table 1. A relatively large proportion of households report meeting 
their consumer credit repayments is a burden (16.2%) compared to far fewer who report 
having been at least 2 months in arrears on their housing payment (2.3%). Using the GHQ 
Caseness Score measure of subjective psychological health, household heads reporting they 
have faced difficulties paying for housing in the last year exhibit on average a score of 3.50, 
compared to 1.87 for those not reporting payment problems. For households who have been 
2+ months late with housing payments the inequality is wider at 2.05 points on the GHQ 
Caseness Score. Household heads reporting their consumer credit commitments are a burden 
exhibit on average scores 0.89 points higher than those with credit commitments which they 
do not report to be a burden.  
These average differences in GHQ Caseness Scores are non-negligible. By way of 
comparison, the equivalent average scores for those household heads who report being 
employed or self-employed is 1.67 compared to an average score of 2.97 among the 
unemployed – a difference of 1.3 points. Hence in an unconditional comparison, the 
inequality in psychological health arising from problem debt in the case of payment arrears 
relating to housing is larger than that arising from unemployment relative to employment. 
  This clear pattern in the subjective GHQ Caseness Score data of problem debt being 
associated with poorer psychological health is also exhibited in the objective data on whether 
individuals are currently experiencing anxiety or related illness as a medical condition. The 
rate of reporting anxiety among those facing difficulty paying for their housing is 16%, 
compared with 8% among mortgaged homeowners or renters not reporting difficulty paying for housing. For the 2+ months late on housing payment the inequality in rates of suffering 
anxiety is of the magnitude of 11% and for consumer credit payments being a burden it is 6%. 
  Of course, it would be wrong to conclude from a comparison of average rates of 
psychological health between the two groups in the cross-section that problem debt causes 
poor health. Firstly, these differences in psychological health by problem debt status might 
arise due to associated differences in characteristics pertaining to psychological health 
between the two groups. Table 2 illustrates that those households exhibiting at least one of 
the three measures of problem debt differ from those not exhibiting problem debt by a broad 
range of characteristics. Those who exhibit at least one of the three measures of problem debt 
(22% of the sample) are typically younger, more likely to be male, less likely to be married, 
more likely divorced, less likely to be educated to degree or a-level standard, less likely 
employed, more likely unemployed and exhibit on average lower household monthly income. 
As the P-values for a test of the equivalence of the means for both groups across these 
variables reveals, all these differences are significant at the 1% level.  
  Secondly, differences in psychological health by problem debt status might arise due 
to a selection effect whereby individuals with poor psychological health are more likely to 
develop problem debt (or, alternatively, those with better psychological health are more likely 
to exit a debt problem). Table 3 describes before and after average GHQ Caseness Scores and 
rates of reporting anxiety for individuals entering problem debt states compared with those 
not entering problem debt states. The statistics suggest that, on average, half of the observed 
difference in psychological health by problem debt status arises due to positive selection into 
problem debt on the basis of poor health. For example, the first two rows illustrate those 
individuals who develop difficulty paying for their housing exhibited higher average GHQ 
Scores and average rates of reporting anxiety in the year prior to developing the housing 
payment problem, compared to those who did not subsequently develop a housing payment problem in the following year. Whereas in the cross-section those reporting difficulty paying 
for housing exhibited on average GHQ Caseness scores 1.63 points higher than those not 
reporting problems, in the transition data the deterioration in GHQ score among those 
developing difficulties paying for housing is on 0.43 points higher. In the case of those 2+ 
months late with housing payments and those who face a ‘somewhat or heavy burden’ of 
consumer credit the difference in the transition is 0.58 (compared with 2.05 in the cross-
section) and 0.24 (compared with 0.99 in the cross-section). The rates of suffering anxiety 
across the transition periods show a similar pattern: those households who develop problem 
debts exhibited high average rates of suffering anxiety before the onset of the debt problem. 
Therefore in each case selection appears to account for most of the cross-sectional 
difference in average psychological health between the two groups. In each case those not 
exhibiting the problem debt state in either period show stable GHQ scores.  This argument 
about selection is obviously not relevant for the ‘2+ months late with housing payment’ 
variable as households may have been very close to 2 months late on their payment in the 
first period. Consequently, the extent of selection might be over-stated if those households 
who exhibit problem debt in the period t+1 were very close to the threshold point of the 
underlying latent problem (the number of weeks or months in arrears on housing payment) in 
period t.  
The impact of controlling for these two factors – associated variables and selection 
into problem debt on the basis of poor psychological health – can be illustrated by the cross-
sectional and panel regression models shown in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows estimates from 
an O.L.S. model estimated over all households with the household’s GHQ Caseness Score as 
the dependent variable. In the cross-section regressions in Columns 1-4, which control for a 
variety of associated demographic and socio-economic factors, the pattern in the coefficients 
on the covariates is as expected: psychological health improves with labour market activity and income (though only weakly), is worse for men and older individuals. The coefficients on 
each of the problem debt measures are positive and significant at the 1% level. In a model 
which includes all three measures, each remains significant at the 1% level, though the 
magnitude of the coefficient on the 2 months late with housing payment variable weakens 
substantially. This is consistent with the finding from Bridges and Disney (2010) that 
financial arrears measures tend to correlate less strongly with psychological health compared 
with subjective problem debt measures.  
The fixed effects estimates in Columns 5-8 exploit within-household changes in 
problem debt status and psychological health. The transition matrix in Table 3 suggested that 
household-specific effects accounted for much of the cross-section variation in psychological 
health. The fixed-effects model is estimated over 11,936 households (10,525 households for 
the models estimated on those households with outstanding consumer credit). Results indicate 
that labour market transitions are significantly associated with changes in psychological 
health in this within-household model. The coefficients on the problem debt variables are 
smaller in the fixed-effects models, as expected from the results in Table 3. Taking the model 
in which all the problem debt variables enter (Column 8), the associations between problem 
debt in this model compared to in the unconditional comparison (values in parenthesis) are: 
subjective difficulty paying for housing 0.62 (1.63), 2+ months late with housing payment 
0.47 (2.05), subjective difficulty paying for consumer credit 0.33 (0.92). Therefore, in each 
case the magnitude of the association between problem debt and poor psychological health 
falls by approximately one-third in each case (leaving aside the 2+ months late with housing 
payment variable). 
Table 5 details results from the same models but with the objective measure of 
psychological health (the 1/0 dummy variable for whether an individual reports suffering 
from anxiety or a related illness) as the dependent variable. In each regression a linear probability model is used. Probit and Logit estimates for the models in Columns 1-4 reveal 
very similar results, for the fixed-effects models the marginal effect on the fixed effect Probit 
/ Logit model is undefined (reference here). The pattern in the results is very similar to that 
seen in Table 4. In the cross-section regressions employment status, gender and age all 
significantly impact the likelihood of an individual reporting they suffer an anxiety-related 
condition. The coefficients on the problem debt variables are all statistically significant at the 
1% level and have positive values. Fixed effects estimates are smaller in magnitude than the 
cross-section equivalents. Comparing the fixed effects coefficients with the unconditional 
differences again reveals the multivariate within-individual estimates shrink the association 
between problem debt and ill health by a magnitude of approximately one-half. 
These results suggest that, depending on the measure of psychological health used, 
approximately one-half to two-thirds of the association between problem debt and 
psychological health observed in the unconditional cross-section comparison between those 
with and without problem debt is accounted for by controlling for associated characteristics 
and exploiting within-household changes (to account for simple selection effects). Of course, 
these results so far cannot be used to conclude that problem debt causes poor psychological 
health. The fixed effects estimates establish there is a clear association between the onset of 
problem debt and the worsening of psychological health at the household level controlling for 
time-invariant heterogeneity, but they do not establish the direction of causality between 
these. 
3.2 Using Exogenous House Price Changes to Understand the Causal 
Relationship between Problem Debt and Psychological Health 
The potential two-way causality in the problem debt – psychological health 
relationship is a major barrier to the researcher seeking to estimate the causal impact of problem debt on psychological health. A similar problem confronts the researcher seeking to 
understand the impact of income on health, as earned income is most likely endogenous to 
health status (on which see Fritjers, 2005; Gardner and Oswald, 2007). The results from the 
previous section document the onset of problem debt is associated with deterioration in 
psychological health, but the causality between these two states might run in either direction. 
Exploiting the time dimension of panel data is unlikely to lead to a solution to this problem, 
even if the onset of problem debt pre-dates a reported deterioration in psychological health 
(or vice versa). An obvious identification strategy is to look for exogenous sources of 
psychological distress or problem health, that is, a variable correlated with psychological 
health which is exogenous to changes in individual indebtedness or, conversely, a variable 
correlated with problem debt which is exogenous to individual changes in psychological 
health. While for psychological health natural experiments might appears appealing sources 
of instrumental variation – such as job loss, death of a spouse or diagnosis with a severe 
physical health condition – all of these are likely also associated with changes in individual 
finances (such as reduced income).  
A search for instruments for problem debt might appear more feasible. The most 
attractive would be exogenous shocks to income or credit supply. However, both are difficult 
to measure or observe in microdata. While shocks to credit limits on individual credit lines 
(such as credit cards or mortgages) would make excellent instruments for problem debt, these 
are also typically not observed in household survey data. One exogenous and observable 
source of credit supply shock is movement in the cost of credit (for the U.K. most obviously 
the Bank of England repo rate against which rates on personal loans and mortgages are 
typically indexed), but this exogenous source of credit supply cost offers no cross-section 
variation. Consequently, to the author’s knowledge no prior study has attempted to exploit these exogenous sources of variation in the severity of problem debt as an identification 
strategy. 
This study instead suggests a novel source of exogenous source of variation in the 
severity of an individual’s problem debt: housing equity shocks arising from movements in 
local-level house prices which make the consequences of arrears on mortgage payments more 
or less severe. The rationale for this is as follows. Local level house prices movements 
provide a source of exogenous variation in the equity in a homeowner’s residence. Unlike 
individual mortgage debt, an individual’s house price movement is largely exogenous to the 
actions of the individual household. However, house price movements do impact upon the 
severity of late or non-payment of mortgage debts via their effect on the housing equity a 
homeowner owns in their home. If faced with difficulty paying a mortgage it is 
unambiguously better for an individual to face such a scenario with more rather than less 
housing equity. More housing equity increases the likelihood of being able to refinance a 
mortgage onto more favourable terms, and increases the equity buffer if an individual is 
forced to sell their home. Hurst and Stafford (2004) present evidence that households use 
housing equity as a source of insurance when faced with income shocks. Therefore, it is 
possible to evaluate the impact of local level house price movements on psychological health 
for individuals who do or do not exhibit problems paying for their housing. The null 
hypothesis under such an exercise is that individuals who exhibit the onset of problems 
paying for their housing but contemporaneously benefit from a positive housing equity shock 
will see less deterioration in their psychological health. 
Using local level house price shocks as an instrument for the severity of problem 
mortgage debt also has the attraction of presenting a natural comparison group: renters who 
experience late payment of their housing payments but do not benefit from increases in the 
value of the home in which they are resident. There is also an added advantage to the homeowners – renters comparison: One objection to using house price shocks as a proxy for 
housing equity movements is that positive house price shocks might also reflect positive local 
income shocks (which increase housing demand and so cause house values in the locality to 
increase), comparing the outcomes for renters with homeowners allows a test of whether this 
is indeed the case. 
Using this strategy, Table 6 presents estimates for the impact of housing payment 
arrears on psychological health (using the GHQ score) allowing for the impact of arrears on 
health to vary by housing equity gain. To illustrate the IV strategy estimates are presented in 
a series of stages. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the GHQ score and dependent 
variables or interest are whether an individual is 2+ months late with their housing payment, 
the change in the local (county) level house price and the interaction of the two. Local level 
house price data is obtained from the Halifax Building Society (now Halifax Bank of 
Scotland) Mix-Adjusted House Price Index, which is available at the county-level. 
 This model is estimated on homeowners only using individual fixed-effects. Hence 
the coefficient on the interaction term should be interpreted as the impact of the onset of 
arrears on mortgage payment for individuals also experiencing a positive house price change 
in their locality of £10,000. In Column 1 the coefficient on 2 months late with housing 
payment is positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient on the change in the 
county-level house price is statistically insignificant. Hence house price changes appear not 
to affect the psychological health of homeowners. However, the interaction term in the third 
row has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The interpretation on the 
coefficient is that an individual who experiences the onset of housing payment arrears but a 
simultaneous positive increase in local-level house prices of £10,000 experiences less 
deterioration in their GHQ score compared with an individual who does not experience a 
positive house price gain. These results suggest that problems with mortgage payments have less an effect on psychological health when they are accompanied by (exogenous) positive 
equity shocks. 
The robustness of this result is examined in the models shown in Columns 2 and 3. In 
Column 2, renting households are used as a comparison group. A second interaction term in 
introduced in the regression which allows the impact of house price movements on 
households with housing arrears to vary depending on whether they are home owners (with 
mortgage arrears) or renters (with rent arrears). The coefficient on the interaction term 
capturing homeowners (row 4) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
whereas the interaction term capturing both renters and owner (row 3) is statistically 
insignificant. The interpretation is as follows: a households experiencing the onset of housing 
payment arrears experiences on average a deterioration in GHQ score of 1.19 points (row 1), 
local level house price increases have no effect on this deterioration for renters (row 3), but 
do have a significant reduction in this effect for homeowners (row 4). These results suggest 
that house price changes do not simply proxy for local economic conditions in these 
regressions (which would also benefit renters), but instead do detect a housing equity effect. 
An alternative robustness test is presented in Column 3. One possible objection to the 
analysis in Columns 1 and 2 might be that house price movements reflect general local credit 
market conditions. However, the results from Column 3 suggest this is not the case as the 
impact on psychological health of the onset of consumer credit problem debt is not affected 
by the contemporaneous movements in house prices at the local level (rows 6 and 7). 
Table 7 presents results from identical models estimated with the (1/0) dummy 
variable for whether the individual suffers from anxiety or a related condition as the 
dependent variable. Results here reveal the same pattern as in Table 6: positive local house 
price movements which accompany the onset of housing payment problems alleviate the 
impact of the payment problem only on homeowning households (Columns 1 and 2) and have no impact on those households experiencing the onset of consumer credit repayment 
problems. 
Taken together, these results from this novel strategy for estimating the impact of 
problem debt on psychological health, suggest that exogenous variation in the severity of 
arrears on housing payment arising from local level house price movements which determine 
home equity does causally affect the extent of deterioration in psychological health (by either 
of the measures used). This identification strategy is by no means straightforward or ideal, 
but presents evidence robust to a variety of instrument-specification tests which verify the 
result. 
3.3 Social Stigma Effects in the Debt-Depression Relationship 
  This final section in the analysis investigates the existence of social stigma effects in 
the relationship between problem debt and psychological health. To the author’s knowledge, 
such effects in the relationship between debt and depression have not been investigated 
elsewhere. This is perhaps surprising: a growing empirical literature in economics finds that 
individual perceptions and choices are influenced by those of others. This raises the prospect 
that reference group effects might present in the relationship between problem debt and 
psychological health. Does the impact of problem debt on an individuals’ psychological 
health depend on the prevalence of problem debt in the local population? Clark (2003) shows 
the impact of unemployment on psychological health is less severe for individuals who live in 
localities in which the unemployment rate is higher, and hence is more of a ‘social norm’ 
among the population. This finding is contrary to a standard labour market analysis in which 
higher local unemployment is indicative of fewer job opportunities and would result in 
increased psychological stress.    The existence of reference group effects is investigated in the following manner. Two 
contexts for problem debts are considered: problem housing debt in the context of the 
prevailing local rate of mortgage arrears; and problem consumer credit debts in the context of 
the prevailing local personal insolvency rate. Mortgage arrears data is provided by the 
Council for Mortgage Lenders, which collects data from all U.K. mortgage lenders on the 
proportion of their outstanding mortgages in various stages of arrears and repossession. We 
use data on the proportion of mortgages at least 3 months in arrears in the region of residence 
in which the households is located (unfortunately data is not available at a more local level). 
For bankruptcy data, we use data on the bankruptcy orders issues by courts in England and 
Wales provided by the Insolvency Service. Unfortunately again data is available only at the 
regional level, so again the ‘reference group’ level of bankruptcy is defined at a relatively 
broad ‘local’ definition.  
  Table 8 presents results of the models in which these reference group levels of 
mortgage arrears and bankruptcy are included in the specification. Column 1 estimates a 
model over all home-owning individuals with the GHQ Caseness Score as the dependent 
variable. The reference group effect is captured by interacting the dummy variable for 
individuals exhibiting 2+ months arrears on their mortgage with the local mortgage arrears 
rate. Results firstly reveal the rate of local mortgage arrears has no impact on the wellbeing of 
mortgage holders independent of being in arrears (row 2). However, the coefficient on the 
interaction term (row 3) implies that individuals experiencing the onset of mortgage arrears in 
regions in which mortgage arrears are more prevalent see less deterioration in their 
psychological health scores compared with individuals who exhibit an onset of mortgage 
arrears in regions with lower mortgage arrears rates. The coefficient value implies this effect 
is small: a regional mortgage default rate of 10% leads to a 0.24 reduction in the GHQ 
Caseness Score of an individual who experiences the onset of mortgage arrears, offsetting approximately one quarter of the negative effect of mortgage arrears on psychological health 
(row 1).  
In Column 2 a similar exercise is undertaken for the case of the subjective consumer 
credit payments burden question and the regional bankruptcy rate. The interaction term 
between the two is again statistically significant (at the 1% level) and, taken together with the 
coefficient on the dummy variable which captures individuals for whom consumer credit is a 
heavy burden, implies the onset of consumer credit problem debt in a region with a 
bankruptcy rate of 10% leads to approximately half the deterioration in psychological health 
which would be experienced at a bankruptcy rate of 0%. Table 9 repeats the exercise from 
Table 8 with the objective psychological stress measure as the dependent variable. In these 
specifications the interaction terms on reference-level mortgage arrears and the bankruptcy 
rate are both negative but not statistically significant. 
These results suggest some evidence in favour of the existence of group effects, but 
only for the subjective measure of psychological health, which may not be surprising. The 
results indicate that the psychological impact of problem debt, both mortgage debt and 
consumer credit debt, is less severe for individuals who live in localities in which problem 
debt is more widespread. This result is in keeping with the finding from the unemployment 
literature that the effect of unemployment on psychological health is less severe in localities 
in which unemployment is more prevalent. One interpretation of these results is that the 
‘social norm’ of problem debt, through peer group effects in localities in which problem debt 
is more prevalent, lessens the anxiety and worry caused by an individual’s problem debt.  
3.  Conclusion 
This study has investigated the relationship between problem debt and psychological 
health, with a particular focus on attempting to understand the causality between the two. The availability of detailed individual-level microdata on psychological health and over-
indebtedness provided opportunity to model the relationship at the individual level, 
controlling for a wide range of associated factors (including other medical conditions) and 
exploiting individual fixed effects. The availability of geographic identifiers in the microdata 
also allows for the matching of local-level data on the prevalence of problem debt into the 
household survey, on the basis of which a strategy towards estimating the casual relationship 
could be implemented and reference group effects could be estimated. 
Results demonstrate that much of the cross-sectional variation in problem debt and 
psychological health is attributable to omitted variables and selection. However, although it is 
difficult to generalise from the IV strategy used in to estimate the causal relationship between 
problem debt and psychological stress, results show that exogenous factors which make the 
consequences of problem debt more severe do impact upon respondents’ psychological stress. 
Furthermore, results provide strong evidence that respondents’ reactions to problem debt 
have a non-negligible social dimension in which the prevailing local level of indebtedness 
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 Table 1 
Average Subjective and Objective Psychological Health Measures By Problem Debt Status 
BHPS Households 1991 – 2008
  Average (S.D.) GHQ Score  
Yes No 












Consumer Credit Repayments a Heavy Burden 








  Proportion (S.D.) Suffering From  
Anxiety-Related Illness 
Yes No 












Consumer Credit Repayments a Heavy Burden 
















 Table 2 
Average Characteristics of Individuals by Problem Debt Status 
  Individual Answers ‘Yes’ to at Least 1 of 
the 3 Problem Debt Questions 
P-value for difference 
 Yes  No   
N  11,792 (22%)  42939 (78%)   
GHQ12 Score  2.99  1.77  0.0000 
Anxiety Health Prob=1  0.15  0.08  0.0000 
Age (years)  38.4  40.7  0.0000 
Male = 1  0.47  0.41  0.0000 
Married = 1  0.63  0.68  0.0000 
Divorced = 1  0.18  0.13  0.0000 
Degree = 1  0.14  0.18  0.0000 
A-Levels = 1  0.20  0.22  0.0009 
Employed = 1  0.65  0.69  0.0000 
Unemployed = 1  0.06  0.04  0.0000 
Monthly Income (£)  £1740  £2195  0.0000 
 
Table 3 
Transition Matrix: Entry into Debt Problems by Psychological Health Measures 
 GHQ12  Score  Suffering  Anxiety 
 Average   
Score at t 
Average  





Difficulties Paying for Housing at t=0 and  










Difficulties Paying for Housing at t=0 and 










       
2+ Months Late with Housing Payment at t=0 
and  










2+ Months Late with Housing Payment at t=0 
and 










       
Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden at t=0 and 










Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden at t=0 and 










 Table 4 
Relationship Between Problem Debt and GHQ12 Score, (O.L.S. Estimates) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
 GHQ12 Score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Difficulties Paying 
for Housing = 1 
1.34** 
(0.04) 




- -  0.62** 
(0.05) 
2+ Months Late 









Consumer Credit a 
Heavy Burden = 1 


















































- - - - 




















































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed  Effects  No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
No.  Observations  65841 65841 54030  54030  65841 65841 54030 54030 
F  168.69 149.41 133.67 141.83  29.51  24.88  17.02  21.89 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared  0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
No.  Groups  - - - -  11936  11936  10525  10525 
*denotes significance at 5% level, **denotes significance at 1% level. Additional control variables: dummy 
variables for spouse educational and employment / self-employment status, dummy variables for skill group 
(professional, skilled, semi-skilled; dummy variables for age of youngest child (0-3years, 3-5 years, 5-12 years, 
12-16 years), dummy variables for whether member of occupational pension plan, whether moved home in last 
year, whether smokes, spouse smokes, plus value of total outstanding mortgage debt in pounds. 
 
 Table 5 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Difficulties Paying 
for Housing = 1 
0.05** 
(0.01) 




- -  0.02** 
(0.001) 
2+ Months Late 









Consumer Credit a 
Heavy Burden = 1 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed  Effects  No No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No.  Observations  65841 65841 54030  54030  65841 65841 54030 54030 
F  180.47 178.74 167.08 165.23 14.60  14.46  8.33  8.99 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared  0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 
No.  Groups  - - - -  11936  11936  10525  10525 
*denotes significance at 5% level, **denotes significance at 1% level. Additional control variables: dummy 
variables for spouse educational and employment / self-employment status, dummy variables for skill group 
(professional, skilled, semi-skilled; dummy variables for age of youngest child (0-3years, 3-5 years, 5-12 years, 
12-16 years), dummy variables for whether member of occupational pension plan, whether moved home in last 
year, whether smokes, spouse smokes plus value of total outstanding mortgage debt in pounds.. 
 
 Table 6 





























2+Months Late Housing Paymt = 1 






2+Months Late Housing Paymt = 1 





Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1  -  -  0.40** 
(0.05) 
Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1 
* Change in real  county-level house price (£’0,000s) 
- -  0.01 
(0.04) 
Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1 
* Change in real  county-level house price (£’0,000s) 
* Home Owner 
- -  -0.01 
(0.05) 
Other Health Conditions  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. Observations  46776  65841  54030 
F 6.14  7.16  5.81 
Prob>F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
No. Groups  8713  11936  10525 







 Table 7 
Exogenous House Price Changes, Problem Debt and Suffering Anxiety (L.P.M. Estimates) 
 
Dependent Variable: 



























2+Months Late Housing Paymt = 1 






2+Months Late Housing Paymt = 1 





Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1  -  -  0.01** 
(0.003) 
Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1 
* Change in real  county-level house price (£’0,000s) 
- -  0.002 
(0.003) 
Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1 
* Change in real  county-level house price (£’0,000s) 
* Home Owner 
- -  -0.007 
(0.005) 
Other Health Conditions  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. Observations  46776  65841  54030 
F 2.28  3.17  2.34 
Prob>F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.01  0.01  0.01 
No. Groups  8713  11936  10525 






 Table 8 
Reference Group Effects: Regional Bankruptcy / Repossession Rates and Effects of Problem 








2+ Months Late Housing Paymt = 1  1.06** 
(0.09) 
- 
Repossession Rate (per 100 mortgage properties)  0.01 
(0.02) 
- 
2+Months Late Housing Paymt = 1 




Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1  -  0.41** 
(0.05) 
Bankruptcy Rate (per 100 households)  -  0.45 
(0.53) 
Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1 
* Bankruptcy Rate (per 100 households) 
- -0.22** 
(0.64) 
    
Other Health Conditions  Yes  Yes 
Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
No. Observations  46776  54030 
F 2.18  2.86 
Prob>F 0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.01  0.01 
No. Groups  8713  10525 








 Table 9 
Reference Group Effects: Regional Bankruptcy / Repossession Rates and Effects of Problem 
Debts on Psychological Health: Suffering Anxiety (L.P.M.) 
Dependent Variable: 
Suffers Anxiety (1/0) 
(1) 




2+ Months Late Housing Paymt = 1  0.02** 
(0.006) 
- 
Repossession Rate (per 100 mortgage properties)  -0.01 
(0.01) 
- 
2+Months Late Housing Paymt = 1 




Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1  -  0.01** 
(0.003) 
Bankruptcy Rate (per 100 households)  -  0.21 
(0.18) 
Consumer Credit a Heavy Burden = 1 
* Change in real  county-level house price (£’0,000s) 
* Home Owner 
- -1.45 
(0.84) 
    
    
Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
No. Observations  46776  54030 
F 2.05  2.16 
Prob>F 0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.01  0.01 
No. Groups  8713  10525 








 Appendix 1: Selected BHPS Health Questions in Full 
 
1.  Specific Health Conditions Question in Full 
‘Do you have any of the health problems or disabilities listed on this card? You can just tell 
me which numbers apply: 
 
•  None 
•  Problems or disability connected with: arms, legs, hands, feet back, or neck 
(including arthritis and rheumatism)  
•  Difficulty in seeing (other than needing glasses to read normal size print) 
•  Difficulty in hearing 
•  Skin conditions/allergies  
•  Chest/breathing problems, asthma, bronchitis  
•  Heart/high blood pressure or blood circulation problems  
•  Stomach/liver/kidneys or digestive problems 
•  Diabetes  
•  Anxiety, depression or bad nerves, psychiatric problems  
•  Alcohol or drug related problems  
•  Epilepsy 
•  Migraine or frequent headaches 
•  Cancer 
•  Stroke 
•  Other health problems (PLEASE GIVE DETAILS)’ 
 
2.  General Health Questionnaire in Full 
“ Here are some questions regarding the way you have been feeling over the last few weeks. 
For each question please ring the number next to the answer that best suits the way you have 
felt.” 
The first question is: 
“Have you recently been able to concentrate on whatever you're doing?” 
With four possible answers: 
“Better than usual ...  
Same as usual . . .  
Less than usual...  
Much less than usual...” 
The next six questions are: 
“Have you recently lost much sleep over worry? 
Have you recently felt constantly under strain? 
Have you recently felt you couldn't overcome your difficulties? Have you recently been feeling unhappy or depressed? 
Have you recently been losing confidence in yourself? 
Have you recently been thinking of yourself as a worthless person” 
With the four possible answers: 
“Not at all ...  
No more than usual ...  
Rather more than usual ...  
Much more than usual ...”  
The next five questions are: 
“Have you recently felt that you were playing a useful part in things? 
Have you recently felt capable of making decisions about things? 
Have you recently been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? 
Have you recently been able to face up to problems? 
Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?” 
With four possible responses: 
“More so than usual ...    
About same as usual...  
 Less so than usual ...   
Much less than usual ...” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 